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Summary 
Although South African courts have expressly held that any evidence
obtained through torture is always inadmissible, the author is unaware of
a decision from a South African court to the effect that evidence obtained
through cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is, like evidence
obtained through torture, inadmissible in all circumstances. In this article,
the author first deals with the issue of evidence obtained through torture
and thereafter relies on the practice of international and regional human
rights bodies, such as the Committee against Torture, the Human Rights
Committee, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the European
Court of Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, and some of the sections of the South African
Constitution, to argue that South Africa has an international obligation to
exclude any evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment. In support of this argument, the author relies on the
jurisprudence of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal on the nature
of the right to freedom from torture and argues that the same approach
could be applied to the right to freedom from cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment.
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1 Introduction
Section 12(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1
provides that everyone has the right ‘not to be tortured in any way’.
Section 12(1)(e) provides that everyone has a right ‘not to be treated
or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way’. The rights under
sections 12(1)(d) and (e) are non-derogable under the South African
Constitution.2 In S v Mthembu,3 the South African Supreme Court of
Appeal (SCA) observed that, as in the case of torture, which is
absolutely prohibited under international human rights law, ‘our
Constitution follows suit and extends the non-derogation principle to
include cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’.4 South Africa is
also a state party to regional and international human rights
instruments that prohibit torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.5 South Africa recently enacted legislation
criminalising torture - the Prevention and Combating of Torture of
Persons Act.6 This legislation which aims at, inter alia, giving effect to
South Africa’s obligations under the Convention against Torture
(CAT), is silent on the issue of evidence obtained through torture.7
Section 35(5) of the South African Constitution provides: 
Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights
must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial
unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 
Section 35(5) allows a court to admit evidence obtained in violation of
a right or rights in the Bill of Rights, provided that the admission of
the evidence in question would not render the trial unfair or otherwise
be detrimental to the administration of justice. There is a growing
jurisprudence from South African courts on section 35(5) and it is
beyond the ambit of this article to deal with that jurisprudence. This is
so especially in light of the fact that this jurisprudence does not deal
with South Africa’s international obligation to exclude evidence
obtained through cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (CIDT).8
Although some of these authors discuss the issue of evidence obtained
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
2 See table of non-derogable rights in the Constitution.
3 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA).
4 Mthembu (n 3 above) para 31.
5 These include the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (art 5); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art 7); and the Convention
against Torture. 
6 Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013.
7 For the process of how international law becomes part of South African case law,
see Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2011 (3) SA 347
(CC), 374-375. See also paras 179-202 (judgment by Moseneke and Cameron JJ).
8 PJ Schwikkard & SE van der Merwe (eds) Principles of evidence (2008) 181-266;
DT Zeffert & AP Paizes The South African law of evidence (2009) 711-775;
A Bellengére et al The law of evidence in South Africa: Basic principles (2013) 234-
245; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (2013) 269-289 (the authors
deal with the rights in sec 12 of the Constitution). 
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through torture, the discussion is very brief and is devoid of reference
to any international human rights instrument.9 South African courts
have held that evidence obtained through torture is inadmissible.
What is not clear is whether evidence obtained through CIDT is also
inadmissible under all circumstances. The purpose of this article is to
rely on the practice of the Committee against Torture (CAT
Committee) to argue that, because of the fact that the circumstances
that lead to torture are not different from those that lead to CIDT,
courts are urged to hold that evidence obtained through CIDT is also
inadmissible. The article first deals with the status of evidence
obtained through torture to lay the ground for the argument that
evidence obtained through CIDT should be inadmissible.
2 South Africa’s international and regional obligation 
to exclude evidence obtained through torture
As mentioned earlier, South Africa is a state party to the CAT. Article
1(1) of the CAT defines torture to mean
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
This definition was relied on by South African courts before the
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act was enacted.10
Section 3 of this Act substantially reproduces the definition of torture
under article 1(1) of the CAT. However, unlike the CAT, the
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act does not prohibit
the admission of evidence obtained through torture. Article 15 of the
CAT provides:
Each state party shall ensure that any statement which is established to
have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in
any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence
that the statement was made.
It is clear that article 15 prohibits the admission of ‘any statement’
which has been made as a result of torture. There are three important
points to note about article 15. One, it does not oblige South Africa to
exclude a statement made as a result of CIDT. It is expressly limited to
9 Bellengére et al (n 8 above) 235; Schwikkard & Van der Merwe (n 8 above) 218;
Zeffert & Paizes (n 8 above) 738 740 747 749 752. In all cases, the discussion is
limited to the SCA judgment in Mthembu (n 3 above).
10 See Mthembu (n 3 above) para 30; Kutumela v Minister of Safety and Security
[2008] ZAGPHC 430 (12 December 2008) para 86.
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torture. This is attributable to the drafting history of article 15.
Attempts by some countries to include CIDT under article 15 were
unsuccessful.11 A strict interpretation of article 15, therefore, means
that South Africa does not have an obligation to exclude statements
made as a result of CIDT. In referring to article 15 of the CAT, the
Supreme Court of Appeal held in Mthembu:12 
In regard to the admissibility of evidence obtained as result of torture,
article 15 of the CAT cannot be clearer. It requires that ‘[e]ach state party
shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as
a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings,
except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement
was made. The absolute prohibition on the use of torture in both our law
and in international law therefore demands that “any evidence” which is
obtained as a result of torture must be excluded ‘in any proceedings.’
The above finding by the SCA brings me to the second point that I
would like to make about article 15 of the CAT. Article 15 refers to
‘any statement’. Jurisprudence and practice from the CAT Committee
shows that in cases where the Committee has dealt with article 15,
the evidence in question was either a confession or a statement.13
However, the SCA held above that the absolute prohibition of torture
in national and international law means that ‘any evidence’ obtained
as a result of torture must be excluded. There are two important
issues to note about this finding. First, the Court, although it refers to
article 15 of the CAT, does not hold, and rightly so in my opinion,
that it extends beyond statements obtained as a result of torture. The
drafting history of article 15 clearly shows that the drafters consciously
made a decision to limit it to statements obtained as a result of
torture.14 Second, in order to ensure that the loophole in article 15 is
cured, the SCA invokes, rather ingeniously, the argument that the
prohibition on the use of torture is absolute in national and
international law and, because of that prohibition, ‘any evidence’
obtained in violation of the right to freedom from torture ‘must be
excluded in “any proceedings”’. This same approach has been
adopted by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in the case of Mukoko v
Attorney-General.15 One should recall that the right to freedom from
11 Eg, in its first proposal Sweden had suggested that the Convention should also
prohibit the admission of evidence obtained through CIDT. See M Nowak &
E McArthur The United Nations Convention against Torture: A commentary (2008)
505-507.
12 Mthembu (n 3 above) para 32.
13 See generally Nowak & McArthur (n 11 above) 512-519.
14 Nowak & McArthur (n 11 above) 505-507.
15 [2012] JOL 29664 (ZS). In this case, the prosecution intended to use evidence
obtained through torture and CIDT in the prosecution of the applicant. In holding
that the evidence in question was inadmissible, the Court held, inter alia, that ‘[i]t
is clear that the rationale for the exclusionary rule against the admission or use of
information or evidence obtained from an accused person or any third party by
infliction of torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment as contained in section
15(1) of the [Lancaster] Constitution, is founded on the absolute obligation
imposed on the state. It is also founded on the revulsion which attaches to the
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torture is not only an absolute right, but that the prohibition against
torture has acquired the status of jus cogens in international law.16 The
Court also emphasises the fact that evidence obtained through torture
must be excluded in ‘any proceedings’. This is broad enough to
include, for example, extradition proceedings. The impact of the
SCA’s ruling in Mthembu means that even a pointing out based on a
statement which was obtained as a result of torture is inadmissible.17
In S v Tandwa & Others18 the SCA, although it did not refer to article
15 of the CAT, quoted with approval a dissenting opinion of one of
the judges of the SCA in an earlier decision to hold that19 
the admission of derivative evidence obtained in circumstances involving
some form of compulsion, or as a result of torture, ‘however relevant and
vital for ascertaining the truth, would be undeniably detrimental to the
administration of justice’. 
Like the SCA, the Constitutional Court also held:20
Where, for example, derivative evidence is obtained as a result of torture
there might be compelling reasons of public policy for holding such
evidence to be inadmissible even if it can be proved independently of the
accused. Otherwise, the ends might be allowed to justify the means. The
admission of evidence in such circumstances could easily bring the
administration of justice into disrepute and undermine the sanctity of the
constitutional right which has been trampled upon.
The above decisions show that any evidence obtained through torture
is inadmissible. It does not matter what the kind of evidence is. The
CAT Committee’s practice, especially with regard to periodic reports
submitted by state parties, shows that the Committee has
recommended that state parties should ensure that ‘any statement’ or
15 source of such information or evidence coupled with its offensiveness to civilised
values and its degrading effect on the administration of justice. The rule applies
even when the evidence is reliable and necessary to secure the conviction of an
accused person facing serious charges. The reliability or probative value of the
information or evidence is irrelevant because its admissibility is prohibited in
absolute and peremptory terms. It is vital in a society governed by the rule of law
that persons in the custody of public officials should not be subjected to ill-
treatment of the level of severity prohibited by section 15(1) of the [Lancaster]
Constitution.’ See 36.
16 CAT Committee General Comment 2 (Implementation of article 2 by state parties)
CAT/C/GC/2, 24 January 2008, para 1. 
17 As was the case in this case.
18 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA).
19 Tandwa (n 18 above) para 19.
20 Ferreira v Levin NO & Others; Vryenhoek & Others v Powell NO & Others 1996 (1) SA
984 (CC); 1996 (1) BCLR 1 para 150.
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statements21 or confessions22 or ‘evidence’23 obtained as a result of
torture should be inadmissible. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture
has also recommended that any evidence obtained as a result of
21 Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the fourth periodic
report of Israel, CAT/C/ISR/CO/4, 23 June 2009, para 25; Concluding
Observations of the Committee against Torture on the fourth periodic report of
Mexico, CAT/C/MEX/CO/4, 6 February 2007, para 22; Concluding Observations
of the Committee against Torture on the third periodic report of Armenia, CAT/C/
ARM/CO/3, 6 July 2012, para 16; Concluding Observations of the Committee
against Torture on the combined fourth to sixth periodic reports of Paraguay,
CAT/C/PRY/CO/4-6, 14 December 2011, para 20; Concluding Observations of the
Committee against Torture on the fifth and sixth combined periodic report of
Finland, CAT/C/FIN/CO/5-6, 29 June 2011, para 21; Concluding Observations of
the Committee against Torture on the initial report of Chad, CAT/C/TCD/CO/1,
4 June 2009, para 29; Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture
on the second periodic report of Tajikistan, CAT/C/TJK/CO/2, 21 January 2013,
para 13; and Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the
third periodic report of Senegal, CAT/C/SEN/CO/3, 17 January 2013, para 13.
22 Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the second
periodic report of Yemen, CAT/C/YME/CO/2/Rev 1, 25 May 2010, para 28;
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the second
periodic report of Jordan, CAT/C/JOR/CO/2, 25 May 2010, para 30; Concluding
Observations of the Committee against Torture on the second periodic report of
Cambodia, CAT/C/KHM/CO/2, 20 January 2011, para 28; Concluding
Observations of the Committee against Torture on the initial periodic report of
Djibouti, CAT/C/DJI/CO/1, 22 December 2011, para 20; Concluding Observations
of the Committee against Torture on the third periodic report of Armenia, CAT/C/
ARM/CO/3, 6 July 2012, para 16; Concluding Observations of the Committee
against Torture on the second periodic report of the Philippines, CAT/C/PHL/CO/
2, 29 May 2009, para 23; Concluding Observations of the Committee against
Torture on the initial report of Ethiopia, CAT/C/ETH/CO/1, 20 January 2011, para
31; Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the second
periodic report of the Republic of Moldova, CAT/C/MDA/CO/2, 29 March 2010,
para 21; Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the fourth
periodic report of Belarus, CAT/C/BLR/CO/2, 7 December 2011, para 18;
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the initial report of
Mauritania, CAT/C/MRT/CO/1, 18 June 2013, para 8(c); Concluding Observations
of the Committee against Torture on the third periodic report of Senegal, CAT/C/
SEN/CO/3, 17 January 2013, para 13; Concluding Observations of the Committee
against Torture on the fifth periodic report of the Russian Federation, CAT/C/RUS/
CO/5, 11 December 2012, para 10; and Concluding Observations of the
Committee against Torture on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of
Mexico, CAT/C/MEX/CO/5-6, 11 December 2012, para 15(a).
23 Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the second
periodic report of Lithuania, CAT/C/LTU/CO/2, 19 January 2009, para 18;
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the second
periodic report of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, CAT/C/MKD/CO/2,
21 May 2008, para 18 (the Committee also called upon the state party to ensure
that any evidence obtained as a result of ill-treatment is inadmissible); Concluding
Observations of the Committee against Torture on the third periodic report of
Iceland, CAT/C/ISL/CO/3, 8 July 2008, para 13; Concluding Observations of the
Committee against Torture on the second periodic report of Cambodia, CAT/C/
KHM/CO/2, 20 January 2011, para 28; Concluding Observations of the
Committee against Torture on the combined third and fourth periodic report of
Sri Lanka, CAT/C/LAK/CO/3-4, 8 December 2011, para 11; Concluding
Observations of the Committee against Torture on the initial report of Ethiopia,
CAT/C/ETH/CO/1, 20 January 2011, para 31; Concluding Observations of the
Committee against Torture on the fifth periodic report of Sweden, CAT/C/SWE/
CO/5, 4 June 2008, para 22; Concluding Observations of the Committee against
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torture be excluded.24 The Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
has recommended that statements obtained as a result of torture not
be admitted in evidence.25 The Human Rights Committee has
similarly recommended that evidence obtained through torture be
inadmissible.26 It is argued that all those situations have different
implications in the South African law of evidence. In cases where a
state is required to ensure that a statement made as a result of torture
is inadmissible, strictly speaking, the obligation in question would
require the state to exclude confessions, admissions and extra-curial
statements. In the South African law of evidence, these are three
different but related kinds of evidence.27 In terms of this obligation,
real evidence based on an inadmissible statement could be admitted.
For example, the statement is excluded but a weapon discovered on
the basis of the statement that was made as a result of torture is
admissible. This is the practice in countries such as Uganda. Ugandan
courts have always excluded confessions or admissions obtained as a
result of torture.28 However, in Uganda ‘evidence obtained through
information obtained by torture is admissible and the police have
been keen to exploit this loophole’.29 In light of the above
jurisprudence from the South Africa courts, this interpretation of
article 15 of the CAT is not acceptable in South Africa. 
23 Torture on the combined fourth to sixth periodic reports of Paraguay, CAT/C/PRY/
CO/4-6, 14 December 2011, para 20; Concluding Observations of the Committee
against Torture on the initial report of Turkmenistan, CAT/C/TKM/CO/1, 15 June
2011, para 20; and Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on
the fifth periodic report of New Zealand, CAT/C/NZL/CO/5, 4 June 2009, para 15;
24 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Juan E Mendez, Mission to Tunisia, A/HRC/
19/61/Add.1, 2 February 2012, para 102(d); and Report of the Special Rapporteur
on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Juan E Méndez, Mission to Ghana, A/HRC/25/60/Add.1, 5 March 2014, para
IV(B)(c).
25 Report on the visit of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to Honduras, CAT/OP/HND/1,
10 February 2010, para 150.
26 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on the second periodic
report of Tajikistan, CCPR/C/TJK/CO/2,22 August 2013, para 14.
27 See, eg, Litako & Others v S [2014] 3 All SA 138 (SCA). In this case, the Supreme
Court of Appeal discusses the differences between confessions, admissions and
extra-curial statements. For a discussion of this case, see JD Mujuzi ‘The
admissibility of an extra-curial admission by an accused as hearsay evidence
against a co-accused in South Africa: Litako & Others v S reconsidering S v Ndhlovu
& Others’ (2015) 19 The International Journal of Evidence and Proof 3-10.
28 See the Republic of Uganda Report to the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (May 2006) para 36.1.
29 As above. Sec 14(1) of the Ugandan Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act
2012, which was assented to by the Ugandan President in July 2012, prohibits the
admission of any information, confession or admission obtained from a person as
a result of torture. For a detailed discussion of this Act, see JD Mujuzi ‘Issues to
grapple with in implementing the Ugandan Prohibition and Prevention of Torture
Act’ (2012) 1 International Human Rights Law Review 382-394.
96                                                             (2015) 15 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
The second issue relates to the CAT Committee’s observation that
state parties should ensure that confessions made as a result of torture
are inadmissible. As mentioned earlier, in the South African law of
evidence there is a clear distinction between a confession, on the one
hand, and an admission, on the other. This distinction has been
emphasised recently by the SCA.30 A strict interpretation of this
approach would mean that an admission and real evidence or any fact
discovered as a result of torture would be admissible. As in the first
situation above, jurisprudence from South African courts shows that
this would also be untenable in South Africa. The last approach, and
one which is supported by jurisprudence from South African courts, is
the requirement to exclude any evidence obtained as a result of
torture. This would require the exclusion of statements, admissions,
confessions, real evidence and any fact discovered as a result of
torture. This is a broader and more progressive application of article
15. Admittedly, article 15 is expressly limited to statements, but it
would be an affront on the accused’s right to a fair trial to admit any
evidence obtained as a result of torture. Admitting evidence obtained
as a result of torture would also encourage law enforcement officers to
use torture easily as a method of interrogation.31 The issue of the
manner in which the CAT Committee and other UN human rights
bodies have dealt with the admissibility of evidence obtained as a
result of CIDT is dealt with in the next section.
As at the United Nations (UN) level, at the African regional human
rights level South Africa also has an obligation not to admit evidence
obtained as a result of torture. As mentioned earlier, article 5 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)
protects the right to freedom from torture. In Egyptian Initiative for
Personal Rights and Interights v Egypt I,32 the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) found that the
victim’s trial had been unfair because they had been convicted, inter
30 See Litako (n 27 above). 
31 In Mukoko (n 15 above), the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held that ‘[t]he
rationale for the exclusionary rule is the protection of any person suspected of a
crime who is in the custody of a public officer from torturous, or inhumane or
debasing invasions of his or her dignity and physical integrity. Its object is to
ensure that criminal prosecutions which are a direct consequence of the pre-trial
illegality violative of fundamental rights of an accused person to freedom from
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment are not used to give legitimacy to such
conduct. The rule has nothing to do with the fair determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused person. Where there is independent evidence which has
been obtained lawfully and on which reasonable suspicion of the accused person
having committed the criminal offence with which he or she is charged is
founded, an order of permanent stay of a criminal prosecution is not justified. The
rule represents a device designed to deter disregard for constitutional prohibitions
and give substance to constitutionally-protected fundamental rights. The
exclusionary rule as a remedy for the enforcement of the protection of
fundamental rights under the Constitution is not intended to immunise an
accused person from criminal prosecution for any action he or she is reasonably
suspected of having committed which is provable at the trial by independent
evidence lawfully obtained.’ See 34.
32 (2011) AHRLR 42 (ACHPR 2001).
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alia, on the basis of confessions obtained as a result of torture. The
African Commission held, inter alia, that33
[i]n interpreting article 7 of the African Charter, the African Commission
has stated that ‘any confession or other evidence obtained by any form of
coercion or force may not be admitted as evidence or considered as
probative of any fact at trial or in sentencing’. … [T]his Commission has
held that ‘any confession or admission obtained during incommunicado
detention shall be considered to have been obtained by coercion’.
The African Commission added that34 
t]hese principles correspond with other international human rights norms,
addressed in relation to torture and ill-treatment, under which evidence
and confessions obtained through torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment, cannot be used in judicial proceedings apart from for the
purpose of prosecuting the act of torture or ill-treatment itself.
The African Commission further stated that35
[o]nce a victim raises doubt as to whether particular evidence has been
procured by torture or ill-treatment, the evidence in question should not
be admissible, unless the state is able to show that there is no risk of torture
or ill-treatment. Moreover, where a confession is obtained in the absence of
certain procedural guarantees against such abuse, for example during
incommunicado detention, it should not be admitted as evidence. 
The African Commission concluded:36
The victims in this case all raised allegations of torture and ill-treatment.
These allegations are at least consistent with the circumstances of their
case, such as the incommunicado nature of their detention and the reports
of the FMA which, at a minimum, indicate a risk of ill-treatment. Despite
these concerns, the ‘confessions’ were admitted as evidence and appear to
have formed at least part of the basis of their convictions and the
imposition of the death penalty. The reliance on such evidence violates
article 7 of the Charter. 
The question is to what extent the above decision of the African
Commission strengthens the position of the exclusion of evidence
obtained as a result of torture. Below are some of the observations
that one could make about the above finding. One, for a confession
or any other evidence to be excluded, it is not a requirement that the
victim has been tortured. All that is needed is that coercion or duress
was used. This is in line with South African law to the effect that, for a
confession to be admissible in evidence, it should have been made
freely and voluntarily and without undue influence.37 The African
Commission also holds that evidence obtained through torture or
CIDT cannot be used in judicial proceedings. This reasoning is broader
than the stipulation under article 15 of the CAT which, as we have
33 Egyptian Initiative (n 32 above) para 212 (footnotes omitted).
34 Egyptian Initiative para 213.
35 Egyptian Initiative para 218.
36 Egyptian Initiative para 219.
37 See sec 217 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
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seen above, is limited to evidence obtained through torture. This issue
will be dealt with in detail below. The third point is that, where a
victim alleges that a confession was obtained as a result of torture,
coercion or duress, the state has the burden to prove that the
confession in question was obtained freely, voluntarily and without
undue influence. This is the same position as in South African law.38
Finally, the African Commission’s finding seems to suggest that for a
confession or evidence that was obtained as a result of torture,
coercion or duress to be inadmissible, the torture, coercion or duress
should have been inflicted or directed against the accused. It is argued
that such an interpretation would make room for law enforcement
officers to torture third parties for the purpose of acquiring evidence
to use against the accused. As indicated earlier, in Mthembu the SCA
held that article 15 of the CAT is applicable to evidence that is
obtained from the accused and third parties. Like the South African
SCA, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court held, in the case of Mukoko v
Attorney-General, that evidence or information obtained from the
accused or a third party through torture is inadmissible.39 The above
discussion demonstrates that, at the national, regional and
international levels, evidence obtained through torture is inadmissible.
Although some South African authors and the Constitutional Court
have cautioned against laying down a hard and fast rule on excluding
evidence obtained through violating any right in the Bill of Rights,40 it
is submitted that there is no doubt that a rule exists in international
law and in South African law that evidence obtained through torture
must be excluded. Below our attention shifts to the question of
evidence obtained through CIDT.
3 Evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and the case for its absolute 
exclusion
It was mentioned earlier that article 15 of the CAT does not require
state parties to exclude evidence obtained as a result of CIDT. Leading
torture scholars have expressed different views on whether states have
an obligation under article 15 to exclude evidence obtained as a result
of CIDT. Some have argued that states have such an obligation and
others have argued that they do not.41 The question that we have to
answer is whether South Africa has an obligation in national and
international law to exclude evidence obtained as a result of CIDT. It
38 Eg, in S v Mkhize 2011 (1) SACR 554 (KZD) para 33, it was held that ‘[i]t is a trite
principle of our law that the onus is on the state to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the confession was made freely and voluntarily, and without any
undue influence, by the accused whilst in his sound and sober senses’.
39 Mukoko (n 15 above) 35.
40 Zeffert & Paizes (n 8 above) 740.
41 Nowak & McArthur (n 11 above) 534-536.
EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH VIOLATING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM TORTURE IN SA       99
will be argued that South Africa has that obligation. In support of my
argument I will rely on South African law and the emerging practice
from international human rights bodies or mechanisms. However,
before I embark on that discussion, it is critical to say a few things
about cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. 
Unlike torture, CIDT is not defined under the CAT. This is
attributable to the drafting history of the Convention. Nowak and
McArthur observe that ‘[d]uring the drafting of article 16, it … soon
became clear that a proper definition of the term cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment was impossible to achieve’.42
Different approaches have been suggested as the criterion that should
be used to distinguish torture from CIDT. Nowak and McArthur argue
that43 
the decisive criterion for distinguishing torture from cruel and inhuman
treatment is not the intensity of the pain or suffering inflicted but the
purpose of the conduct, the intention of the perpetrator, and the
powerlessness of the victim. 
They add that ‘[d]egrading treatment or punishment can be defined as
the infliction of pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, which
aims at humiliating the victim’.44 On the other hand, the CAT
Committee has stated that ‘[i]n comparison to torture, ill-treatment
may differ in the severity of pain and suffering and does not require
proof of impermissible purposes’.45 The Committee stated that46
[t]he obligation to prevent torture in article 2 is wide-ranging. The
obligations to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment (hereinafter ‘ill-treatment’) under article 16,
paragraph 1, are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The
obligation to prevent ill-treatment in practice overlaps with and is largely
congruent with the obligation to prevent torture. Article 16, identifying the
means of prevention of ill-treatment, emphasizes ‘in particular’ the
measures outlined in articles 10 to 13, but does not limit effective
prevention to these articles, as the Committee has explained, for example,
with respect to compensation in article 14. In practice, the definitional
threshold between ill-treatment and torture is often not clear. Experience
demonstrates that the conditions that give rise to ill-treatment frequently
facilitate torture and therefore the measures required to prevent torture
must be applied to prevent ill-treatment. Accordingly, the Committee has
considered the prohibition of ill-treatment to be likewise non-derogable
under the Convention and its prevention to be an effective and non-
derogable measure.
In a South African context, it is important to draw a distinction
between torture, on the one hand, and CIDT, on the other. This is
because of the fact that courts have expressly held that any evidence
obtained through torture must be excluded. Of course, the inquiry to
42 Nowak & McArthur 540.
43 Nowak & McArthur 558 (emphasis in original).
44 As above.
45 CAT Committee General Comment 2 (n 16 above) para 10.
46 CAT Committee General Comment 2 para 3.
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exclude that evidence has to be conducted in light of section 35(5) of
the Constitution. It is submitted that there is only one possible
outcome of the inquiry under section 35(5) of the Constitution when
the court is dealing with evidence obtained through torture: that
evidence must be excluded. In other words, once a court finds that
torture was used, it has no alternative but to exclude the evidence. In
the case of Tandwa, the SCA held that evidence obtained through any
form of ‘compulsion’ is inadmissible. Another meaning for compulsion
is force, and force always includes physical power or the threat of
physical power. In other words, the person in custody, although not
tortured, knows that if he or she does not make a confession or give
evidence, he or she will be forced physically to do so. The SCA makes
it very clear in Tandwa:47
Though ‘hard and fast rules’ should not be readily propounded, admitting
real evidence procured by torture, assault, beatings and other forms of
coercion violates the accused’s fair trial right at its core, and stains the
administration of justice. It renders the accused's trial unfair because it
introduces into the process of proof against him evidence obtained by
means that violate basic civilised injunctions against assault and
compulsion. And it impairs the administration of justice more widely
because its admission brings the entire system into disrepute, by
associating it with barbarous and unacceptable conduct.
It is critical at this point to also recall the distinction between two
kinds of evidence: a confession or an admission and derivative
evidence, that is, real evidence or any form of evidence discovered as
a result of a confession. As mentioned earlier, in terms of section
217(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act,48 for a confession to be valid it
has to have been made freely and voluntarily, the confessor must have
been in his or her sound and sober senses and he or she must not
have been unduly influenced. At common law, an admission must
also be made freely and voluntarily for it to be admissible.49 Against
that background, a confession made as a result of CIDT is inadmissible
on the basis of section 217. However, the inquiry does not stop there.
Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides:
(1) Evidence may be admitted at criminal proceedings of any fact
otherwise admissible in evidence, notwithstanding that the witness
who gives evidence of such fact, discovered such fact, or obtained
knowledge of such fact only in consequence of information given by
an accused appearing at such proceedings in any confession or
statement which by law is not admissible in evidence against such
accused at such proceedings, and notwithstanding that the fact was
discovered or came to the knowledge of such witness against the
wish or will of such accused. 
(2) Evidence may be admitted at criminal proceedings that anything was
pointed out by an accused appearing at such proceedings or that any
fact or thing was discovered in consequence of information given by
47 Tandwa (n 18 above) para 120.
48 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
49 See generally Litako (n 27 above).
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such accused, notwithstanding that such pointing out or information
forms part of a confession or statement which by law is not
admissible in evidence against such accused at such proceedings.
In the case of Matlou & Another v S, the SCA held:50
Undoubtedly, there is a direct clash between s 218(2) of the [CPA] and s
35(1)(a); (b); and (c) read with s 35(5) of the Constitution. It is this conflict
which we are required to resolve in this appeal. The answer to this
somewhat intractable legal conundrum lies in s 35(5) of the Constitution
which provides: ‘Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in
the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would
render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of
justice.’
The above ruling by the SCA shows that the mere fact that a
confession has been held inadmissible on the basis that it was
obtained in violation of the accused’s right does not mean that any
fact or pointing out derived from that confession, in itself, is
inadmissible. The question that a court would have to answer is
whether the admission of the evidence in question would render the
trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.
In the case of torture, the confession and the derivative evidence
would have to be inadmissible. However, the position is unclear with
regard to a confession obtained as a result of violating the accused’s
right to freedom from CIDT. The author has not come across any case
in which a South African court held that any evidence obtained as a
result of violating the accused or a third party’s right to freedom from
CIDT is inadmissible. This means that, for example, a suspect could be
detained under dehumanising conditions to compel him to disclose or
point out where he hid the weapon he used in the commission of an
offence. Because of the fact that the conditions of his detention
cannot be classified as torture, nothing bars a court to invoke section
35(5) to admit the weapon in question as evidence. It should be
recalled that the Constitutional Court has expressly held that ‘[w]hile
it is not easy to distinguish between the three concepts “cruel”,
“inhuman” and “degrading”, the impairment of human dignity, in
some form and to some degree, must be involved in all three’.51
South African courts have given the following as some of the
examples of treatment that amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment: degrading punishments;52 excessive punishments;53
50 [2010] 4 All SA 244 (SCA) para 22.
51 S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) para 35.
52 S v Saayman 2008 (1) SACR 393 (E), where the accused was convicted of fraud
and the magistrate ordered, inter alia, that she should stand for 15 minutes every
day ‘in the foyer of the court carrying a placard bearing her name, the fact of her
conviction, and an apology to certain of the victims of the frauds’. On appeal it
was held that that punishment violated sec 12(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
53 In S v Fhetani 2007 (2) SACR 590 (SCA) it was held that a ‘grossly disproportionate
sentence does not only violate the accused person's right to a fair trial but also his
or her right not to be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner’ (para
6); S v Makena 2011 (2) SACR 294 (GNP) para 13, where the court held that
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asking witnesses irrelevant and uncomfortable questions;54 the
manner in which the deceased was murdered;55 the setting of police
dogs to suspected illegal immigrants;56 and corporal punishment.57
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this article is to argue that South
African courts should invoke international human rights law practice
to treat evidence obtained through CIDT in the same way as evidence
obtained through torture. In order to support my argument, I make
the points below. 
Section 39(1)(b) obliges South African courts to consider
international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights. Courts have indeed
referred to international law, both binding and non-binding on South
Africa, in interpreting the Bill of Rights.58 The starting point is
therefore the position of international law on the question of the
admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of CIDT. The 1975 UN
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment59 provides under article 12 that 
[a]ny statement which is established to have been made as a result of
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment may not be
invoked as evidence against the person concerned or against any other
person in any proceedings.
53 ‘[w]hat has been said about rehabilitation and reformation applies to the period of
the appellant's rehabilitation, viewed from the appropriateness or otherwise of the
imprisonment for 50 years. It is my considered view, based on the sentences
emanating from the Supreme Court of Appeal, that effective sentences exceeding
25 years' imprisonment are not confirmed lightly. Again, the basis for this may be
the emphasis on reformation and rehabilitation, based, inter alia, on the
constitutional precept that punishment should not be cruel or be deemed to be
such. This statement is made with the full knowledge and appreciation of the
gravity and devastating effects that the loss of the victim's life has inevitably
inflicted on his family, society and the country.’ See also S v Nkosi & Others 2003
(1) SACR 91 (SCA) para 9; S v Niemand 2001 (2) SACR 654 (CC).
54 S v Mbhele 2008 (1) SACR 123 (N) para 6.
55 S v Vermeulen 2004 (2) SACR 174 (SCA) para 33, where the court held that
‘[b]efore the deceased died he was not only physically assaulted but also
emotionally traumatised. While he lay injured, the appellant and his brother
carried on a discussion about first killing him and then burying him under the
carcass of a cow. He was then moved to the cornfield. Once there, some
discussion took place to the effect that he should not be shot because that would
attract attention. A grave was dug for him while he was still alive. Ultimately, he
was struck with a pick axe and buried in the most undignified way possible - for
doing no more than collecting firewood. In my view, the aggravating
circumstances of this case far outweigh all the other factors, when balanced
against one another. The killing was cruel, inhuman and degrading and no self-
respecting society can tolerate deeds of this nature.’
56 S v Smith 2003 (2) SACR 135 (SCA) para 11.
57 See eg Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757
(CC).
58 See, generally, E de Wet ‘The “friendly but cautious” reception of international law
in the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court: Some critical
remarks’ (2004-2005) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1529-1565.
59 GA Res 3452(XXX) of 9 December 1975.
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Practice from international human rights mechanisms also appears
to be moving towards the exclusion of evidence obtained through
CIDT. While commenting on Austria’s periodic report, the Human
Rights Committee, the body overseeing the implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
welcomed ‘the introduction of an express prohibition of evidence
obtained by means of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, or other unlawful interrogation methods’.60 The Human
Rights Committee also recommended that the United States should
‘refrain from relying on evidence obtained by treatment incompatible
with article 7’ of the ICCPR.61 Article 7 of the ICCPR provides that
‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment’. This clearly means that the
Human Rights Committee has made it very clear that evidence
obtained through CIDT should be inadmissible. It is argued that this
evidence is not limited to confessions but to all evidence. Like the
Human Rights Committee, the CAT Committee welcomed legislative
steps in Austria on ‘the prohibition of evidence obtained by means of
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, or other unlawful
interrogation methods’.62 The CAT Committee has called on Gabon
to ‘amend its legislation in order to make it clear that confessions,
statements and other evidence obtained through torture or ill-
treatment may not be invoked as evidence in legal proceedings’.63
The Committee made a similar recommendation to Rwanda.64 The
UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism urged
the United States of America to ensure that ‘evidence obtained by any
form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment [is not]
admitted in [any] proceedings’.65 The UN Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Judges and Lawyers urged the government of
Tajikistan to prioritise the fact that66 
60 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Austria’s fourth
periodic report, CCPR/C/AUT/CO/4, 30 October 2007 para 5(a).
61 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on the second and
third periodic reports of the United States of America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev 1,
18 December 2006, para 14.
62 Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the fourth and fifth
combined periodic reports of Austria, CAT/C/AUT/CO/4-5, 20 May 2010, para
5(a)(i).
63 Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the initial report of
Gabon, CAT/C/GAB/CO/1, 17 January 2013, para 24.
64 Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture on the initial report of
Rwanda, CAT/C/RWA/CO/ 1, 26 June 2012, para 23.
65 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin,
Mission to the United States of America, A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, 22 November 2007,
para 60.
66 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,
Leandro Despouy, Mission to Tajikistan, E/CN.4/2006/52/Add.4, 30 December
2005, para 91.
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[a]dequate legal amendments should be introduced to ensure that
confessions and other evidence obtained through torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or duress should under no circumstances be
admissible in trials. 
As mentioned earlier, the African Commission expressly held in
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Arab Republic of
Egypt67that evidence obtained through CIDT was inadmissible. It is
argued that, from an international human rights perspective, there is
merit in the argument that South African courts should expressly hold
that any evidence obtained as a result of CIDT is inadmissible. There
are numerous decisions in which the European Court of Human Rights
has found that evidence obtained through torture or duress is
inadmissible.68 In Jallow v German,69 the Court, although it left open
the ‘the general question whether the use of evidence obtained by an
act qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment automatically
renders a trial unfair’,70 it added that71
[i]t cannot be excluded that on the facts of a particular case the use of
evidence obtained by intentional acts of ill-treatment not amounting to
torture will render the trial against the victim unfair irrespective of the
seriousness of the offence allegedly committed, the weight attached to the
evidence and the opportunities which the victim had to challenge its
admission and use at his trial.
The Court concluded that it ‘finds that the use in evidence of the
drugs obtained by the forcible administration of emetics to the
applicant rendered his trial as a whole unfair’72 because it had, inter
alia, been obtained in violation of the applicant’s right to freedom
from inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to article 3 of the
Convention.73 Therefore, there is evidence that there are cases where
the European Court of Human Rights would find evidence obtained
through CIDT inadmissible. However, because of the fact that the
Court leaves open the question of whether such evidence should be
excluded, this leaves room to some courts to admit such evidence. It
is argued that the best approach is that adopted by the African
Commission and the practice of the UN human rights bodies above
that such evidence should be excluded.
The second point to be made is that, like the right to freedom from
torture, the right to freedom from CIDT is also an absolute and non-
67 Egyptian Initiative (n 32 above).
68 See, eg, Baran and Hun v Turkey Application 30685/05 (20 May 2010) para 72.
See also Desde v Turkey Application 23909/03 (1 February 2011); Fidanci v Turkey
Application 17730/07 (17 January 2012); Özcan Çolak v Turkey Application
30235/03 (6 October 2009) para 49; Harutyunyan v Armenia Application 36549/
03 (28 June 2007).
69 Jallow v German Application 54810/00 (11 July 2006).
70 Jallow v German (n 69 above) para 107.
71 Jallow v German para 106.
72 Jallow v German para 108.
73 Jallow v German para 82. See also Ümit Gül v Turkey Application 7880/02
(26 September 2009).
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derogable right under the South African Constitution and in
international law.74 As mentioned earlier, in Mthembu, the SCA held
that75 
[t]he absolute prohibition on the use of torture in both our law and in
international law therefore demands that ‘any evidence’ which is obtained
as a result of torture must be excluded ‘in any proceedings’. 
The CAT Committee emphasised that, like the obligation to prevent
torture, the obligation to prevent CIDT is also non-derogable.76 This
means, inter alia, that if courts admit evidence which has been
obtained through CIDT, they indirectly cast doubt on the absolute
and non-derogable nature of the right to freedom from CIDT. South
African courts have held that some forms of punishment amount to
CIDT and are therefore unconstitutional.77 If a form of punishment
that amounts to CIDT is unconstitutional and, therefore, courts are
absolutely prohibited from imposing it, one would expect the courts
to follow the same logic when it comes to evidence obtained through
CIDT. This should be understood against the background that
admitting evidence obtained through CIDT could lead to encouraging
law enforcement officers to engage in such acts with the inherent
danger that they could cross the boundary and end up torturing their
victims. As mentioned earlier, the CAT Committee stated:78 
In practice, the definitional threshold between ill-treatment and torture is
often not clear. Experience demonstrates that the conditions that give rise
to ill-treatment frequently facilitate torture and therefore the measures
required to prevent torture must be applied to prevent ill-treatment. 
One of the measures required to prevent torture is the inadmissibility
of any evidence obtained as a result of torture. The exclusion of any
evidence obtained through CIDT would ultimately strongly contribute
to the fight of torture. 
It should also be noted that article 16(1) of the CAT provides:
Each state party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I, when
such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and
13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references
to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
74 Art 4 ICCPR.
75 Mthembu (n 3 above) para 32.
76 CAT Committee General Comment 2 (n 16 above) para 6.
77 This has been the case with respect to the death penalty, life imprisonment
without the possibility of release and corporal punishment. See, generally,
JD Mujuzi ‘Punishment in the eyes of the Constitutional Court of South Africa: The
relationship between punishment and the rights of an offender in the sentencing
of primary caregivers of children’ (2011) 24 South African Journal of Criminal Justice
164-177.
78 CAT Committee General Comment 2 (n 16 above) para 3.
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Admitting evidence obtained through CIDT would be contrary to
South Africa’s obligation under article 16(1) of the CAT. Furthermore,
if a person has been treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way for
the purpose of obtaining evidence from him or her, such evidence
should be inadmissible because, as the SCA held in Mthembu:79
Public policy … sets itself firmly against admitting evidence obtained in
deliberate or flagrant violation of the Constitution. If, on the other hand,
the conduct of the police is reasonable and justifiable, the evidence is less
likely to be excluded – even if obtained through an infringement of the
Constitution. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to think of a situation where a violation
of the right to freedom from CIDT for the purpose of obtaining
evidence would be reasonable and justifiable. It should be
remembered that the SCA does not state that the conduct has to be
reasonable or justifiable. The conduct in question must be reasonable
and justifiable for the possibility to admit evidence obtained in
violation of the Constitution to arise.
Section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that ‘[w]hen
interpreting the Bill of Rights a court, tribunal or forum … may
consider foreign law’. South African courts have indeed considered
foreign law in interpreting the Bill of Rights.80 It is against this
background that it is submitted that South African courts may find
jurisprudence emanating from other countries, especially African
countries, on the legal status of evidence obtained through CIDT
persuasive.81 Jurisprudence emanating from some African countries is
to the effect that evidence obtained through CIDT should be treated
79 Mthembu (n 3 above) para 26.
80 Eg, in Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2014 (6) SA 456 (CC);
2014 (10) BCLR 1137 (CC) para 52, the Constitutional Court held that ‘[i]t is
helpful to consider foreign law when dealing with a right recognised in the Bill of
Rights’.
81 However, the South African Constitutional Court referred to sec 39(1)(c) and held
that ‘[f]oreign jurisprudence is of value because it shows how courts in other
jurisdictions have dealt with the issues that confront us in this matter. At the same
time, it is important to appreciate that foreign case law will not always provide a
safe guide for the interpretation of our Constitution. When developing our
jurisprudence in matters that involve constitutional rights … we must exercise
particular caution in referring to foreign jurisprudence.’ See President of the
Republic of South Africa & Others v M & G Media Ltd 2012 (2) BCLR 181 (CC); 2012
(2) SA 50 (CC) para 16. In H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 (2) BCLR 127 (CC);
2015 (2) SA 193 (CC) para 31, the Court held that ‘[f]oreign law has been used
by this Court both in the interpretation of legislation and in the development of
the common law. Without attempting to be comprehensive, its use may be
summarised thus: (a) Foreign law is a useful aid in approaching constitutional
problems in South African jurisprudence. South African courts may, but are under
no obligation to, have regard to it. (b) In having regard to foreign law, courts
must be cognisant both of the historical context out of which our Constitution
was born and our present social, political and economic context. (c) The
similarities and differences between the constitutional dispensation in other
jurisdictions and our Constitution must be evaluated. Jurisprudence from countries
not under a system of constitutional supremacy and jurisdictions with very
different constitutions will not be as valuable as the jurisprudence of countries
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as evidence obtained through torture and must be excluded. For
example, section 15(1) of the Lancaster Constitution of Zimbabwe
provided that ‘[n]o person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading punishment or other such treatment’. The same
prohibition has been enshrined in article 53 of the 2013 Constitution
of Zimbabwe.82 However, unlike the Lancaster Constitution, the 2013
Constitution includes a provision which regulates the admissibility of
evidence obtained through human rights violations.83 In Mukoko,84
which was decided on the basis of the Lancaster Constitution, the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, in granting the applicant’s application
for a permanent stay of prosecution on the ground that the evidence
that was to be adduced at her trial had been obtained through torture
and CIDT, referred to jurisprudence from different jurisdictions,
including South Africa, and to article 15 of the CAT and held, inter
alia: 85
The obligation on the state, through its agents, not to admit or use in
criminal proceedings, information or evidence obtained from an accused
person or any third party by infliction of torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment is not explicitly set out by a separate provision in the
Constitution. It would be contrary to the object and purpose of the
prohibition under section 15(1) of the Constitution to allow admission or
use of such information or evidence in any legal proceedings. A proper
interpretation of section 15(1) of the Constitution which takes into account
the purpose and broadness of the language underlying the importance of
the fundamental value protected, compels the Court to conclude that the
obligation on the state not to admit or use information or evidence
obtained from an accused person or any third party by infliction of torture,
or inhuman or degrading treatment in any legal proceedings attaches to
the prohibition of such treatment by section 15(1) of the Constitution. The
obligation is inherent in the general terms of the section. It enjoys with the
general prohibition the same qualities of being absolute and non-
derogable. The condemnation is more aptly categorised as a constitutional
principle than as a rule of evidence.
81 founded on a system of constitutional supremacy and with a constitution similar
to ours. (d) Any doctrines, precedents and arguments in the foreign jurisprudence
must be viewed through the prism of the Bill of Rights and our constitutional
values.’
82 Art 53 of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that ‘[n]o person may be
subjected to physical or psychological torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment’. 
83 See sec 70(3) which provides that ‘[i]n any criminal trial, evidence that has been
obtained in a manner that violates any provision of this chapter must be excluded
if the admission of the evidence would render the trial unfair or would otherwise
be detrimental to the administration of justice or the public interest’.
84 Mukoko (n 15 above).
85 Mukoko 32-33.
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Although courts in other African countries, such as Lesotho,86
Swaziland,87 Namibia,88 Tanzania,89 Malawi,90 Zambia91 and
Kenya,92 have held that evidence obtained through torture is
inadmissible, the author is not aware of any other court, apart from
the Zimbabwean Supreme Court, which has held that evidence
obtained through CIDT should be treated as evidence obtained
through torture. It is submitted that if South Africa follows the
international trend and also the example of the Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe, the protection of human rights, and in particular the right
to a fair trial, will be strengthened.
Section 39(2) of the South African Constitution provides that
‘[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’. In
Mthembu the SCA held:93 
In the pre-constitutional era, applying the law of evidence as applied by the
English courts, the courts generally admitted all evidence, irrespective of
how obtained, if relevant. The only qualification was that ‘the judge always
(had) a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of admissibility
would operate unfairly against an accused’.
The SCA refers to case law to support its view that, even before the
constitutional era, some judges held that evidence which had been
obtained from the accused involuntarily had to be excluded.94 South
African courts have invoked section 39(2) of the Constitution to
develop common law which deals with, inter alia, the right to a fair
trial. This has been the case, for example, with regard to the
offender’s right to be heard before a court imposes a sentence on him
or her and the offender’s right to be heard before an appeal court
increases his or her sentence.95 It is submitted that nothing prevents
courts from developing common law by holding that evidence
obtained through CIDT is inadmissible. It should be remembered that
in developing common law, courts should always remember South
Africa’s international obligations. As the Constitutional Court held in
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others,96 ‘[w]hen
courts are required to develop the common law … they must
86 R v Mpobane (CRI/T/1/94) [1999] LSCA 26 (25 March 1999).
87 R v Dladla & Others (168/1998) [1998] SZHC 2 (1 January 1998).
88 S v Malumo (CC 32/2001) [2010] NAHC 20 (1 March 2010).
89 Mkika v Republic (Criminal Appeal 47 of 2001) [2003] TZCA 2 (1 August 2003).
90 Palitu & Others v Republic [2001] MWHC 43 (19 September 2001).
91 People v B (1980) ZR 219 (HC) 234.
92 See JD Mujuzi ‘The Constitution in practice: An appraisal of the Kenyan case law
on the right to a fair trial’ (2008) 2 Malawi Law Journal 135-157.
93 Mthembu (n 3 above) para 22.
94 Mthembu para 23.
95 See JD Mujuzi ‘Developing common law to expand the meaning of the right to a
fair trial in South Africa: The accused’s right to be heard before the court imposes
the sentence’ (2013) 42 Common Law World Review 137-150.
96 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC); 2013 (10) BCLR 1103 (CC).
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remember that their “obligation to consider international law when
interpreting the Bill of Rights is of pivotal importance”’.97
4 Conclusion
Section 35(5) of the South African Constitution empowers a court to
admit evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill
of Rights, provided that the admission of the evidence would not
render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the
administration of justice. South African courts have over time
developed rich jurisprudence on section 35(5).98 Courts have held
that any evidence obtained through torture is inadmissible. This is
because of the absolute prohibition on torture and the fact that the
admission of such evidence would always render the trial unfair and
be detrimental to the administration of justice. Courts have not come
out to expressly hold that evidence obtained through CIDT is, like the
evidence obtained through torture, inadmissible and should be
excluded under all circumstances. Relying on the practice of
international human rights mechanisms, such as the CAT Committee,
the Human Rights Committee, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture,
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers and the African Commission, the author has argued that
South Africa has an international obligation to exclude evidence
obtained through CIDT. The author has also relied on the
jurisprudence of the SCA to argue that there is room for a strong case
to be made for the exclusion, under all circumstances, of any evidence
obtained through CIDT. The author has also demonstrated that the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held that evidence obtained through
CIDT should be treated as evidence obtained through torture and
should be excluded.
97 Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick & Others (n 96 above) para 66.
98 Zeffert el at (n 8 above) 711-775.
